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Abstract
We look at the di¤erent ways of aggregating the exports of dual use
products to give the security perception of exporter countries and their
consistency with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze dif-
ferent models of export controls highlighting the role of the perception of
security, market structure and competition between exporting …rms in de-
termining the existence of multiple equilibria and therefore, the need for
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the Post Cold War era, the perceived security requirements of the main pro-
ducers of weapons have changed signi…cantly1. Among these concerns, we have
civil strife and ethnic con‡ict (e.g. Kosovo), terrorism, regional threats, the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction and even the environmental consequences
of improper storage or disposal of military related material, especially nuclear
technologies.
In 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) determined that
the ”proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to inter-
national peace and security” and the member countries committed ”to working
to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of
such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end”. The fact that among
the members of the UNSC we …nd the most important exporters of weapons
highlights the importance of this commitment. Indeed, prior to 1992 Western
industrialized countries had already started to organize supply-side controls on
transfers of weapons-related technologies.
At present, there are a number of multilateral export control regimes which
include the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC) which
address nuclear technology, the Australia Group (AG) which deals with chemical
and biological military-related material, the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) and the Wassenaar Agreement (WA) which refers to conventional arms
and dual use goods and technologies. Also, extreme export controls in the form
of embargoes have been monitored by the UN and NATO (e.g. Iraq).
As the spin-o¤s between the civil and the military sector now ‡ow in both
directions and the speed of technological innovation is very high in these sectors,
the scope of the above mentioned export controls extends to goods or technolo-
gies which have a direct or potential military applications, the so called dual use
products.
In this paper, we present di¤erent ways of aggregating the exports of dual use
products to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency
with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze di¤erent models of
export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security, market structure
and competition between exporting …rms in determining the existence of multiple
equilibria and therefore, the need for coordination between countries in setting
export controls.
There is some literature which analyzes the issue of arms control (Hartley and
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Sandler (1995) and Sandler and Hartley(1995)). This has been in part motivated
by the arms control treaties between the US and the former Soviet Union in the
1980s. At that time the security perception of those countries was highly in‡u-
enced by their involvement in an arms race. This situation resulted in an extensive
literature that focused on the analysis of defence expenditure in defence alliances
with defence expenditure considered as a public good to which the members of
an alliance contribute (Hartley and Sandler 1999). In addition to arms races, the
trade in arms a¤ects perceptions of security and raises the related issue of export
controls.
A number of recent papers have introduced the trade in dual use products as an
important factor in the study of security among the main exporters. The common
feature is that these models introduce arms and dual use products exports as hav-
ing a negative e¤ect on the suppliers security-i.e. these exports generate negative
externalities on exporter countries. This idea approaches the problem of export
controls for dual use products in the same way as some environmental problems
like global warming and nuclear waste anti-dumping (Rotillon et al. (1996) and
Moody-O’Grady (1995)). Both issues have generated a need for agreements at the
international level and discussions over the concept of security: military security
or environmental security. The key di¤erence between them is the importance
that the market structure and competition between exporter …rms has on the
ability to control the exports of dual use products exports: this creates a double
interaction between countries at the security level and at the exports pro…ts level
which sometimes generates a need for the design of speci…c mechanisms that help
multilateral agreements to be implemented.
In the arms trade literature, Levine et al. (1994) and Levine and Smith (1995)
present a model that speci…es not only the economic features but also political
characteristics of the arms trade. They provide a formal model of trade which
allows for competing forward looking suppliers whose welfare depends on both the
economic bene…ts from the sales and the security repercussions of the recipient’s
behavior.
In García-Alonso and Levine (1997) and García-Alonso (1998a), the consid-
eration of military …rms and exporting governments as di¤erent decision makers
is introduced and strategic e¤ects involved in the decision on domestic weapons
procurement and arms exports are analyzed. Also, Levine and Smith (1997)
and García-Alonso (1998b) introduce the issue of exports controls for dual use
technologies in two di¤erent ways. The …rst paper studies di¤erent forms of co-
operation between arms exporters deciding on domestic procurement and arms
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exports and compares, among other things, the equilibrium quantities in each case.
García-Alonso (1998b) examines the relationship between the optimal subsidiza-
tion policies of & investments of exporters of dual use technologies with the
existence of a unilateral or multilateral concern for security in exporter countries.
A key di¤erence between the various papers is the way each of them models
the e¤ect of exports on security. Whilst they all contemplate the negative e¤ect of
exports on the suppliers security, the way in which these exports are aggregated
di¤ers depending on whether or not product quality is considered.
The issue of aggregation technologies has also been raised in the context of
public goods. Conybeare et al. (1994) discussed di¤erent ways of aggregating mil-
itary capabilities of the members of a military alliance. Also, it has been applied
to international environmental agreements in Sandler and Sargent (1995). Cornes
and Sandler (1996) provide a detailed review of the relevant literature. However,
export control agreements have not yet been analyzed under this perspective.
The paper is organized as follows. First, it presents some stylized facts of arms
exports. Second, it examines the di¤erent ways of aggregating dual use products
exports to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency
with the relevant export control regimes. Third, it analyzes di¤erent models of
export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security, market structure
and competition between exporting …rms in determining the existence of multiple
equilibria and therefore, the need for coordination between countries in setting
export controls. Finally, it describes the most signi…cant characteristics of the
existing dual use export controls.
2. SOME STYLIZED FACTS
This section describes some of the main features of the international arms trade
which our model seeks to address. Arms exports are big business in a market
dominated by relatively small numbers of supplying and buying nations. Over
the period 1993-1997, the USA was the world’s leading supplier accounting for
47% of total weapons deliveries; and the top 5 suppliers, including Russia, UK,
France and Germany, accounted for 82% of total deliveries. Over the same period,
the top 10 recipients of defence equipment accounted for over 50% of total imports
(ranked by value of imports, these were Saudi Arabia; Taiwan; Turkey; Egypt;
South Korea; China; Japan; Greece; Kuwait: SIPRI 1998). It might be expected
that small numbers of nations, especially as suppliers, are more likely to reach an
international agreement on arms export controls.
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Participation in the world arms market will partly re‡ect the di¤erent compar-
ative advantages of both buyers and sellers with the market re‡ecting vertical dif-
ferentiation. Some nations will specialize in supplying costly, high technology arms
exports (e.g. France; UK; USA); others will specialize in supplying cheaper, low
technology arms exports (e.g. Brazil; China). Similarly, buying nations will have
di¤erent income levels a¤ecting their ability to pay with poorer nations demanding
cheaper and hence lower technology arms, with such demands re‡ecting the com-
parative advantage of their national armed forces (e.g. labour-intensive conscript
forces with limited human capital will require ”simple technology” weapons).
Arms exports are determined by the usual price and non-price variables, but
they are ’di¤erent’ in their dependence on political variables. Governments dom-
inate the market through support for their national defence industries and their
role in allowing arms exports and determining the terms of trade (e.g. R&D levies;
favourable …nancial terms). Governments might also favour certain nations (e.g.
allies; former colonies; friends) which might then be viewed as ”captive markets”).
Defence industries have the characteristics of both a military and economically
strategic industry. They are economically strategic in terms of & intensity,
spin-o¤s and decreasing cost re‡ecting both economies of scale and learning (San-
dler and Hartley, 1999). With high …xed & costs and decreasing unit pro-
duction costs, output is a major determinant of unit total costs. Disarmament
following the end of the Cold War has resulted in fewer new projects and smaller
national orders leading to pressures for defence companies to seek export markets.
For national governments, arms exports are a means of maintaining their defence
industries in an era of disarmament with exports resulting in ’wider economic
bene…ts’ (Hartley, 2000). But there are trade-o¤s with governments having to
choose between support for their domestic defence industries and their concern
with the possible impacts of arms exports on national security (e.g. importing
nation might be a future threat to the exporting nations either directly or through
regional con‡icts which involve the exporting nation).
This concern with both national defence industries and national security might
a¤ect the exporting nation’s attitude to the form of export controls where these
vary between quantitative and qualitative. At the limit, there might be a com-
plete ban on arms exports, but such a policy is not costless and the nation has
to estimate the economic impacts of a ban, including the costs of retaining any
defence industrial capability for national defence needs. Obvious costs from an
export ban include losses of jobs and exports, higher prices for national defence
equipment and the costs of either retaining capacity or shutting it down and
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re-starting between gaps in orders (Martin, Hartley and Sta¤ord, 1999; Hartley,
2000). An alternative to a complete ban might be to control the quantity of
arms exports to certain nations or to control their quality. Restrictions on quality
mean that the exporting nation would refuse to supply the latest high technology
equipment to foreign buyers. For example, combat aircraft and helicopters might
be exported but without the latest radar, avionics and stealth features; conven-
tional submarines might be exported but not nuclear-powered submarines. Of
course, importing nations might respond to these various forms of export controls
by buying from other nations or developing their own national defence industry
(c.f. Israel and South Africa).
Policies on arms exports can be either national or international, with inter-
national agreements o¤ering the prospects of a public good in the form of peace.
But international collective agreements involve substantial transaction costs in
identifying participating countries, negotiating an agreement and then monitor-
ing and enforcing it. Collective decisions are needed on the de…nition and range of
weapons to be included in the agreement, the target importing nations to which
the agreement applies, the policing and monitoring arrangements, the penalties for
non-compliance and the incentives created for illegal trading. Even the de…nition
of weapons causes problems, especially for dual use equipment (e.g. helicopters
can be used as civil passenger transports or as military transports and observation
posts). And, in the …nal analysis, actual arms export controls are implemented
by nation states. These stylized facts form the background for our formulation of
models of export controls.
3. TECHNOLOGIES FOR AGGREGATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
This section examines di¤erent ways in which negative externalities caused by
exports of dual use products can be aggregated to give a perception of the security
consequences for the suppliers of this trade. Also, we discuss which …ts better with
each of the current export control arrangements. The discussion ignores the e¤ect
on security of domestic procurement in each of the exporter countries2. Let 
denote the military capability exported by country  and  represent the overall
e¤ect of exports on supplier ’s security:
 =  (1  )  (3.1)
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where,  is the number of exporters and  is decreasing in all arguments.
The speci…c aggregations we now propose resemble those used in the public
good literature for aggregating individual contributions in the supply of public
goods. However, the interpretation is somewhat di¤erent; we obtain the aggregate
negative externality on suppliers produced by exports of dual use equipment.
The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function is extensively analyzed
in Cornes and Sandler (1996) as a generalized technology of public good supply
aggregation. The arms trade literature has also made use of the CES function3for
the aggregation of arms exports (García-Alonso (1998a) used it as part of a general
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This aggregation …ts best with military capability being related to quantity
exported of homogenized dual use products and provides a rationale for quantita-
tive export controls. Also it could be applied to global warming where products
are homogenized in terms of the units of CO2 they produce.
When  approaches1 we have a technology of aggregation in which what de-
termines the global negative externality is the maximum of the exported military
capabilities:
 = ¡max (1  )  (3.4)
An interesting property of this aggregation is that increases in any of the
countries’ exported military capability do not a¤ect security unless it goes beyond
the level exported by any of the other countries. In this case, we get close to the
best-shot technology for aggregating individuals’ contributions to public goods.
This was used …rst in Hirshleifer (1983) for public goods. García-Alonso (1998b)
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used it for the aggregation of dual-use goods exports to give a perception of
security on exporter countries. This method …ts well when the quality and not
the quantity of the product exported is what really a¤ects security. However,
note that with this type of aggregation, only the highest exported quality a¤ects
security. One could also consider the case in which other lower exported qualities
also a¤ect security4, however, the best shot aggregation provides a good index of
security perception of countries that set qualitative export controls which specify
lists of products which cannot be exported, based on their applicability to military
purposes (e.g. AG).
Let us now discuss which de…nition of military capability seems to correspond
best with the existing dual use export controls. In general, military capability is
a function both of the quality and quantity of exports. Export controls could be
either quantitative or qualitative. The …rst term would embrace controls which
set a numerical ceiling on permitted classes of the amount of exports. The second
term would imply limits on the performance or quality of exports of dual use
products (this classi…cation is similar to the one proposed in Panofsky (1990)). In
practice, the existing export control agreements refer to the quality or powerful-
ness of dual use technologies exported. It does not seem that the countries taking
part in these agreements perceive quality and quantity as being substitutes for
each other. For instance, in the U.S., The National Defense Authorization Act on
High Performance Computers (HPC)5controls and restricts the exports of pow-
erful computers to a group of 50 countries including Russia, China and Israel.
It is obvious that in this case quality and quantity are not substitutes for each
other. In other words, having a computer which is able to simulate a nuclear
experiment is not at all the same as having many computers which don’t have
enough power to do it. It could be argued though, that, in terms of security, it
should not be the same one restricted country having access to a higher quality
than several restricted countries managing to acquire it. For instance, if India had
access to HPC and Pakistan did not, would it be better or worse for the exporters
security than both getting it?. There is no clear answer. In principle, one the
two countries having HPC should be worse, but, Pakistan and India (as most of
the importers of restricted dual use goods) are involved in an arms race. Under
this consideration, exporting a high tech good to India only could dangerously
destabilize the arms race, besides, the willingness to pay of Pakistan to pay for
the high tech would increase making it even more tempting for producer countries
to export it to Pakistan too. We can then conclude that quality alone gives a good
index of the de…nition of military capability for countries who are interested in
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implementing export controls.
In the following section, we use the best shot technology in presenting di¤erent
noncooperative games that attempt to explain the strategic interaction between
countries involved in export control arrangements and how their decisions are
a¤ected by the exports market structure. We …rst use a discrete choice model
in which governments are faced with the decision of whether or not to restrict a
domestic …rm’s export quality. We then extend the discussion to a continuous
choice and general security function situation.
4. THE RESTRICTION GAME
4.1. Discrete choice model
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the exports control problem is the two
level interaction between governments deciding their optimal export controls and
still caring about their domestic …rms which compete in the international market
for dual use products. The decision faced by exporting countries can be presented
in the following way:
 =  +  (4.1)
where is social welfare,  is the domestic …rm’s pro…ts,  = ¡max (1  )
and  is the degree of security concern of the government so if  = 0 the govern-
ment’s and the …rm’s problem would be equivalent.
Consider now an export market composed of two countries with one …rm each
exporting dual use products to the rest of the world. Firms compete in qualities
and governments face the decision on setting export controls on the quality that
the home …rm exports or not. It is very helpful at this point to start with a
discrete choice model and a best shot technology for aggregation. In this case, the
problem faced by governments is indeed a two choice game and it is presented in
…gure 1. As can be seen, the pro…t of each …rm depends on the quality that both
export,  (1 2)  the …rst quality is the quality exported by …rm in country 1
and second term is quality exported by …rm in country 2.
The game we present in this section is a version of García-Alonso (1998b).
That paper presented a three stage game in which governments commit to an
& subsidy for the domestic …rm before …rms choose their & investment.
Once governments know the outcome of the& process, they choose the optimal
technology security policy which takes the form of a maximum exportable quality.
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This policy becomes relevant when the domestic …rm is successful in & and it
consists of allowing or not the domestic …rm to export the innovation depending
on the quality available to the competitor. Given this policy, …rms make their
quality choices and, …nally, compete in prices.
Our intention is to focus on the game theoretical interaction between exporter
countries whose …rms have been successful in developing a higher quality. The fact
that governments are not able to commit on export controls before …rms invest in
& makes our simpli…ed game valid for our purposes. All & costs are sunk
and governments know the quality that competitors are able to sell. It is then
left with the exports control decision. Our objective is to analyze the problem
involved in implementing a multilateral export control regime given that member
countries already have access to the technologies whose exports they intend to
restrict
There are two qualities that …rms are able to produce:  and  with   
The dilemma faced by governments consists of deciding whether or not to allow
the higher quality to be exported. The result of this game will depend crucially
on the kind of competition between exporting …rms and on the degree of concern
for security,  of each government.
Consider a situation in which importer countries care about quality but they
also perceive the product o¤ered by each …rm as di¤erent: in other words, we
consider a model of horizontal di¤erentiation in which quality matters (see Econo-
mides (1989) for an example of this). In this case, the pro…t functions of each
…rm would be increasing in its own quality so that 1 ( )  1 (  ) 
2 (  )  2 (  )  Also, if both …rms export the same higher level of
quality, their pro…t is not smaller than they would obtain if none of them could
export the innovation- i.e.,  ( ) ·  (  )   = 1 2 Finally, pro…t is
a decreasing function of the competitor’s quality- i.e., 1 ( )  1 ( ) 
2 (  )  2 ( )  1 (  )  1 (  ) and 2 (  )  2 ( ) 
Under these conditions, given that government 2, for instance, restricts its …rm
export’s quality to  government 1 will restrict its …rm too if and only if when
it restricts, welfare is higher, 1 (  )  1 ( ). For this to be the case
the degree of security concern of government 1 should be higher than:
1 (  )¡ 1 ( )
 ¡ 
´ ¤1 (4.2)
This provides a cut-o¤ line between security concerned and unconcerned gov-
ernments. In this context, a security concerned government would be that which
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would restrict the exported quality if it were the only one to have the high quality.
If both governments are security concerned (i.e., 1  
¤
1 and 2  
¤
2), we
have two Nash equilibrium in pure strategies6in the game presented in Figure
1: Either both governments restrict (R) or neither of them restricts (NR) the
domestic …rm. This is because restricting one’s own …rm only a¤ects security if it
lowers the maximum exported quality. If the high quality level is available from
the other country’s company then it is better for the government not to restrict
its home …rm so that it can compete e¤ectively. These two possible equilibria
can be ranked by comparing the welfare that the governments achieve in each of
them. It is easily shown that governments prefer the equilibrium in which both
restrict if their concern for security is higher than:
 (  )¡  ( )
 ¡ 
´ ¤¤  (4.3)
Note that, since the pro…t functions are decreasing in the competitor’s quality,
the degree of security concern for which governments prefer a global restriction is
smaller than the degree of security concern for which one government decides to




1 2  
 1 ( )¡ 1 2 ( )¡ 2 1 ( )¡ 1  2 ( )¡ 2
 1 (  )¡ 1  2 (  )¡ 2 1 (  )¡ 1  2 (  )¡ 2
In general, the discrete choice games with two symmetric Nash equilibria one
of them being Pareto dominant was …rst analyzed in Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
and considered as a possible example of negative externalities in Dybvig and Spatt
(1983). The problem with this game is that it is di¢cult to give a clear prediction
of which of the two equilibria will result. Indeed, even if both governments get
together before deciding whether to restrict or not and assure they plan to restrict
we should not expect that they believe each other (Aumann, 1990). The reason is
that, independently of its own choice, government 2 gains if government 1 restricts,
hence, government 2 would always say it is going to restrict, even when it is not
planning to restrict. This characteristic of the game is due to the fact that a
…rm’s pro…ts depends on both exporters quality, so that …rms always prefer to
have a leadership in quality with respect to the other …rm. If …rms had their own
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captive markets the situation would be di¤erent. In the extreme case, having a
captive exports market means that the …rm’s pro…t function would no longer be
dependent on the other …rm’s exported quality. In this situation, the game would
have the features of the Stag Hunt game and pre-play communication would help
countries to implement a multilateral restriction.
It has been discussed (Sandler and Sargent, 1995) that, especially in coordina-
tion games in which players don’t trust each other, a mixed strategies equilibrium
makes sense. For the game in Figure 1, the mixed strategies equilibrium is given
by the probabilities of the other country cooperating that makes them indi¤erent
between restricting or not. For government 2 this probability is:
2 =
1 (  )¡ 1 ( )
1 ( )¡ 1 (  ) + 1 ( ¡ ) + 1 (  )¡ 1 ( )
 (4.4)
Therefore, if both governments implement the restriction with a probability
bigger than  the both governments restricting equilibrium would be the pre-
dicted outcome. Note that an increase in the degree of security concern clearly
favours the chances of the restricting equilibrium.
As predicted for these types of games in the literature, an increase in the
number of countries which have access to the high quality and take part in a mul-
tilateral restriction game would diminish the chances of observing the restriction
on quality implemented. The …rst reason is that, according to our de…nition of
security, one country not restricting exported quality has the same e¤ect on se-
curity as all countries defecting. As a consequence,  would be bigger with more
countries and the chances of a multilateral restriction smaller (see Sandler and
Sargent, 1995 and Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995 chapter 1)). Besides, an increase
in the number of exporting countries will also increase competition and a¤ect
negatively the per country pro…ts and therefore, the payo¤ matrix.
Consider now the e¤ect of the existence of uncertainty over the degree of
security concern of governments. For instance, imagine a situation in which gov-
ernment 1 has some uncertainty over the degree of security concern of government
2 such that, 2 is the probability that 2  
¤
2 and 1¡ 2 is the probability that
2  
¤
2 Rewriting the game in Figure 1 in terms of expected welfare for govern-
ment 2 we conclude that, although none of the governments restricting remains a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, the both governments restricting equilibrium
might disappear if it is su¢ciently unlikely that government 2 cares about secu-
rity. It is also worth noting that, if government 2 does care about security, it is
in its self interest to reveal it to the security conscious country.
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4.2. Continuous choice model
The previous section assumed that, when restricting, countries were faced with
a discrete choice. This makes sense in cases in which innovation processes are
discrete and the qualitative di¤erences between two di¤erent generations of prod-
ucts are signi…cant in terms of security. In other instances, like a missile’s speed
or precision, it is very di¢cult to justify a discrete choice framework. Also, if
countries were attempting to restrict quantity a continuous choice would be more
suitable.
This section analyzes the restriction game in a continuous choice environment.
Governments will be confronted with a continuous choice of restriction. Our
objective is to see under which conditions we obtain multiple equilibria in this
framework7. For this purpose, we will use a model in which governments must
decide the amount of dual use products they allow their …rms to export taking
into account both the domestic …rms pro…ts and the security consequences of such
exports. We use the general form of security described in equation (3.1), and the
welfare function stated in equation(4.1) Therefore, the problem for government
1 is presented as follows:

f1g
1 (1 2) + 11 (1 2)  (4.5)







This is also the reaction function of government 1 to the quantity allowed to
be exported by government 2. A necessary but not su¢cient condition for having
multiplicity of symmetric Nash equilibria is that both reaction functions have a















The denominator of this expression must be negative for this is the slope
measured at a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a su¢cient condition for the slope
to be positive is that the numerator is positive. In other words, we need the
government’s marginal welfare of increasing the exported military capability to
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rise with increases in the other governments exported capability. Note that this
is a property present in the discrete choice games studied in the previous section.
When the other country does not restrict, it becomes welfare improving for the
government not to restrict as opposed to the case in which the other country
restricts exported quality.
As by exporting military capability, countries are generating a negative exter-
nality not only to themselves but also to the other exporters we can say in general
that equilibria in which the exports level is higher will imply lower welfare9. If
there is a unique Nash equilibrium, the level of exported military capability is
higher than the Pareto optimal one: in this case we would have a Prisoner’s
Dilemma problem. In other words, we have a unique Nash equilibrium which is
Pareto inferior.
4.3. Introducing vertical di¤erentiation
So far, we have analyzed the nature of the game played by countries that, having
access to the ’state of the art’ technology and, based on security grounds, aim to
prevent …rms from exporting it to other countries.
However, there are also countries which do not have access to the high-tech
products but instead, they export low-tech products to importers who cannot
a¤ord to buy the highest quality. Using the literature on vertical di¤erentiation
(e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1982)), when importers have di¤erent incomes, low
tech …rms would still have some positive pro…ts by selling a lower quality at lower
prices to low income countries. An interesting feature of the vertical di¤erentiation
models is that the optimal quality for the low-tech …rm is an increasing function
of the quality exported by the high tech …rms. Therefore, in a continuous choice
environment, if countries involved in exporting high qualities manage to agree to
diminish the quality of their exports, low tech exporters would also diminish their
qualities in order to keep the quality gap between them. This would hold even if
their governments did not care about security (as long as the restricted quality is
above the technological frontier of low tech countries).
5. EVALUATION OF MULTILATERAL MILITARY RE-
LATED EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
This section identi…es the characteristics of the multilateral military-related ex-
port control regimes which reveal the coordination problems involved in these
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regimes and the coordination mechanisms designed by some of them in order to
achieve an e¤ective multilateral restriction regime10.
Table 1 presents the membership of the di¤erent export control regimes and
the year in which each was created. First note that most of the regimes were
created by the end of the Cold War and therefore, the perception of military
related exports as having a negative e¤ect on security is a characteristic of the
post-Cold War era. Interestingly, the last regimes to be created are those which
target speci…cally dual use products and technologies. This can be seen as the
consequence of the spin-o¤s between the civil and the military sector increasingly
‡owing in both directions.
It is a general characteristic of these export control regimes that they are
implemented through national export control mechanisms. Therefore, they are
all voluntary arrangements. The conditions for membership di¤er between them
but, they have in common that the prospective member must develop or have
national export controls on the relevant items. Besides, the overall approach of
the country to non-proliferation issues is also taken into account.
So far, we have seen that the military related export controls are multilateral in
the sense that they are implemented by a group of countries whose common char-
acteristic is having national export controls, which signals an individual concern
for security. But, these agreements do not have direct enforcement power: mem-
bership is voluntary and there is no penalty system. What then is the role they
play in facilitating multilateral restrictions? The same question has been posed
for other multilateral institutions that attempt to promote international trade co-
operation (e.g. Maggi (1999) for the World Trade Organization). In that case, we
have a Prisoner’s Dilemma which, as is well known, when played repeatedly leads
to a multiplicity of equilibria. This paper has used a static game structure where
a multiplicity of equilibria arises and, with that, the need for coordinating on
the good equilibria. Some of the suggested roles of a multilateral institution, like
export control arrangements, would be to act as an information gathering agency,
generate a sense of ’international obligation’ and promote multilateral rule mak-
ing. In doing so, these multilateral arrangements add an important feature to the
individual national export controls of the security concerned countries which is
the joint implementation of coordination mechanisms.
The information gathering is made in most of the export control arrange-
ments through agreed lists of controlled items. These lists describe the products
and technologies which are considered relevant for each speci…c export control
arrangement. In building up these lists member countries make explicit the items
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over which member countries are security concerned. This plays an important role
in the national implementation of the export control because, as was seen in the
previous section, uncertainty about the degree of security concern of other poten-
tial exporter countries makes it less likely that an equilibrium in which countries
multilaterally decide to restrict is achieved. Also, especially for dual use goods, it
is sometimes technically di¢cult to de…ne which goods can have potential military
application. Therefore, deciding over lists is a way for some countries to realize
the military application of some dual use products about which they might not
be aware.
In the case of the ZC and the NSG, the list of controlled items is called the
Trigger List, the reason being that any potential export of a listed item to a non-
nuclear weapon state triggers the need for International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards. The safeguards aim to verify that the potential importer is
not using nuclear material or equipment to develop or produce nuclear weapons.
In May 1997 the IAEA safeguards were strengthened and renamed as full scope
safeguards. A key element of the new safeguards is an enhanced information sys-
tem managed by the IAEA based on expanded declarations on nuclear transfers.
The members of the NSG have agreed on implementing full scope IAEA safe-
guards over potential transfers of items in the Trigger List. Again, this makes
clear the way in which countries make explicit their perception of security and
therefore, it helps in achieving the multilateral implementation of export controls.
We have seen the positive aspects of the existence of agreed lists of controlled
items. Nonetheless there might be some risks involved in relying too much on
lists when dealing with dual use goods. First, there is the updating problem:
for technologies in which innovation speed is high it can be di¢cult to have lists
which react quickly to changes in the technological patterns of military related
products. Encryption technology is one of the best current examples. Besides,
…rms competing in export markets might advance a potential restriction over the
items it attempts to export and therefore, try, arti…cially, to change their charac-
teristics so that they are not subject to export controls: this does not necessarily
mean that their goods are not military related anymore. Maybe, this is the reason
why in the WA the list of controlled items has not yet been released. Another
way of avoiding the lack of ‡exibility of the lists system is to add discretionary
mechanisms for speci…c cases. Here, we could include the catch-all or know rule
used in the MTCR. The idea is that, if an exporter is aware that an item will con-
tribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the export should be
prevented whether or not it conforms to technical parameters of the commodity
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control list.
There is one …nal coordinating mechanism that can help security concerned
countries to implement a multilateral export controls and which can be found in
the regulations of the Australia Group. In June 1993, the AG adopted a so-called
no-undercut policy11.
The policy seeks to avoid a situation in which an AG member competing for a
lucrative business deal tendered by a potential proliferator would grant an export
licence under the presumption that otherwise another AG state would do so. The
AG countries honour the decisions of other AG states to deny a particular export.
If an AG country does not grant an export licence it noti…es the other AG states
of its decision and provides them with information regarding the goods, their des-
tination and the end-user. If, however, a second AG member has doubts about or
disagrees with the proliferation risk assessment on which the original denial was
based, it is obliged to consult with the country that denied the export licence before
proceeding with a sale, which otherwise would undercut the original denial. The
outcome of this consultation mechanism can be either that the state which has
issued the denial noti…cation revokes it, and thus allows the export to proceed, or
that both countries agree on the soundness of the denial and, consequently, refuse
the licence. (SIPRI Yearbook 1998).
The no undercut policy is a tool that recognizes the role played by competition
between di¤erent exporter …rms in the implementation of export controls. As
seen in the previous section, designing credible mechanisms by which governments
make explicit their decision not to take competitive advantage from other countries
restrictions is especially important in export industries where competition is …erce
and exporting …rms have no captive markets. It is not by chance then, that the
need for an undercut policy was intensively discussed between the members of the
WA. However, the members of the WA have not yet agreed to refuse a licence for
a transfer of the same product to the same destination where another member
has denied it.
Most of the export control agreements also have regulations that prohibit
unauthorized re-transfers. These regulations become especially important in the
case of dual use products. A country might decide to export a dual use product
to a country which does not care about security as long as it is sure that it is not
going to be used for a military application. But, this country could re-transfer
the product to a country which would use it for military purposes as it does not
care about security. The prohibition of transfers attempts to avoid this event.
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Altogether, we have seen that multilateral export controls have some features
which make them di¤erent from other international institutions. The need for
coordination can arise in a static game environment. The reason for this is the
irreversibility of the decision over exporting some of the most dangerous technolo-
gies. A decrease in CO2 emissions can always ameliorate the pollution problems
and eliminating barriers to trade can improve welfare but, once a (potentially)
massive destruction technology has been transferred to an aggressive country, the
exporter countries will have to bear the security costs in perpetuity.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed military related export control regimes using a game the-
oretic analysis of the interaction between countries setting export controls under
di¤erent market structures. We have explained that the military related exports
…rms are involved in oligopolistic competition but, they still have strong links with
their governments, a fact which encourages the existence of captive markets. Also,
high & investments have quickly increased the quality level which make these
products more dangerous and the de…nition of dual use more di¢cult. In this
context, exporter countries face a trade-o¤ between security and pro…ts. After
discussion of di¤erent methods of aggregating the e¤ects of exports on producer
countries, we have concluded that exported quality provides a good index of the
exporters’ perception of security.
In a discrete choice environment, the exports control game was shown to be
a coordination game in which whether or not the Pareto superior both countries
restricting equilibrium is obtained cannot be predicted with certainty. The exis-
tence of captive markets increases the chances of coordination but, an increase in
the number of players or the existence of uncertainty over the degree of security
concern of the other country decreases these chances seriously. This emphasizes
the important role played by the interaction between competing exporter …rms in
the prediction of the viability of multilateral exports control. We have also iden-
ti…ed the properties of the perception of security and exporter …rms’ pro…ts that
result in the export control game becoming a coordination game in a continuous
choice environment. Finally, we have studied the e¤ect that high-tech exporters
restrictions can have on low-tech producers using results from the vertical di¤er-
entiation literature. The analysis was then supported with di¤erent examples of
actual international agreements. Throughout the paper we have focused on multi-
lateral export controls in which all countries have a concern for security. However,
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there are other situations in which a security concerned country can enter into a
bargaining process with a security unconcerned country in order to persuade it
through some compensation not to export a speci…c security sensitive technology
(Jehiel et al. (1996) and Rotillon et al. (1996)) or try to implement a penalty
system (Smith and Udis (1998)).
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FOOTNOTES
* This paper has been written in the context of the participation of the author
in a group working on arms trade, …nancially supported by the ESRC under the
grant R000235685. We would like to thank Javier Coto, Alan Carruth, Andy
Dickerson, Todd Sandler and Ron Smith for helpful comments.
1 For an exhaustive analysis of these changes, especially in Europe, see Mollas-
Gallart and Robinson (1998).
2 See e.g. García-Alonso (1998b) and Levine and Smith (1997) for an analysis
of the strategic interactions between domestic procurement and arms exports
decisions.
3 For a full explanation of the CES production function see Varian (1992).




some quality adjusted weights).
5 HPC are those of speeds above 2000 theoretical operations per second (MTOPS).
The most recent regulations on the exports of HPC have been implemented in
February of 1998 (Federal Register, Vol. 63, No. 22. Tuesday, February 3, 1998.
Rules and Regulations).
6 If only one of the two countries cares about security the game would clearly
have a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which none of the govern-
ments restricts. However, countries could still engage in a bargaining process
which could lead them to a Pareto superior equilibrium. Such possibility has
been analyzed in Jehiel et al. (1996) and Rotillon et al. (1996) for the nuclear
technology exports and global warming, respectively.
7 The issue of multiplicity of equilibria and coordination failures has also been
analyzed in the macroeconomics literature. See Cooper and John (1988) as an
example. For an application to the analysis of arms races see Brito and Intriligator
(1999).











































9 With positive externalities the implication would be the opposite: see Cooper
and Andrew (1988).
10 The information we analyzed here is based on SIPRI Yearbook 1997 and
1998 and the web pages they refer to.
11 See US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ”Australia Group” (28
Oct. 1997), URL http://www.acda.gov/factshee/wmd/cw/aus496.htm.
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